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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-2477
___________
MOHAMED RIZWAN KAMURDEEN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A098-580-337)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Henry S. Dogin
_______________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 1, 2010
Before: RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: April 13, 2010)
_________
OPINION
_________

PER CURIAM
Mohamed Rizwan Kamurdeen petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order of removal. We will deny the petition.

I.
Kamurdeen is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in the United States in 2003 on a
visitor’s visa, which he overstayed. He concedes removability, but seeks asylum,
withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture on the grounds
that he suffered past mistreatment in Sri Lanka and fears future mistreatment if returned.
According to Kamurdeen’s asylum application statement (A.R. 326-28), he and his
family lived in an apartment next to their landlord’s home. On May 19, 2000, two ethnic
Tamil school friends of Kamurdeen visited him at his family’s apartment. His landlord
and the landlord’s two sons, who “did not like” ethnic Tamils, came to his apartment and
asked him not to let his friends stay the night. A fight between the landlord’s sons and
Kamurdeen’s friends ensued, but the landlord and his sons ultimately left the scene.
Approximately one hour later, army personnel who were friends of the landlord’s son
Sisira visited the landlord’s house, then came to Kamurdeen’s apartment, beat his Tamil
friends, beat Kamurdeen and his father when they intervened, and told his friends to leave
immediately or be arrested under suspicion of association with the rebel Tamil Tigers.
Kamurdeen’s friends then left.
On June 5, 2000, “in the midnight,” Kamurdeen heard screaming from the
landlord’s house and saw masked men with weapons abducting his son Sisira and driving
him away in a van. The landlord and his other son then came to Kamurdeen’s apartment,
told him that the assailants were Tamil, and accused his friends of being involved. Army
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officers arrived shortly afterwards, questioned Kamurdeen about the incident, and then
arrested him and took him to an army camp. While there, they accused him of supporting
the Tamil Tigers and interrogated him about his Tamil friends, his landlord’s son’s
whereabouts, and the assassination of a prominent politician. They also beat and tortured
him, at one point hanging him from a bar and pouring water on his head when he
collapsed. The army ultimately released him on August 15, 2000, in exchange for a bribe
paid by his father, but instructed him to report back once per week until further notice.
Kamurdeen left Sri Lanka the next month, working for a period of time in Dubai
and then Kuwait. He obtained a visa to travel to the United States while in Kuwait with
the assistance of an “agent,” who told him he would have to return to Sri Lanka and travel
to the United States from there. Kamurdeen did so, and stayed in a hotel near the airport
for approximately two weeks until leaving for the United States on September 14, 2003.
Before the IJ, Kamurdeen submitted an affidavit from his mother, which was
substantially in accord with his statement. He also testified consistently with his
statement and his mother’s affidavit, with the significant exceptions discussed below.
The IJ assumed that Kamurdeen stated grounds for asylum and withholding of removal on
the basis of imputed political opinion. He denied Kamurdeen’s claims, however, because
he found Kamurdeen not credible on the basis of numerous inconsistencies and
implausibilities in his testimony. He also faulted Kamurdeen for failing to produce
certain corroborating evidence. The BIA upheld the adverse credibility determination on
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the basis of several factors on which the IJ relied, but did not mention any concern with
corroboration. Kamurdeen petitions for review.1
II.
The BIA identified three deficiencies that it deemed collectively sufficient to
support the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. (BIA Dec. at 1-2.) First, and “[m]ost
strikingly” according to the BIA, is an inconsistency regarding the date and circumstances
of Kamurdeen’s arrest. Kamurdeen stated in his asylum application, and his mother
stated in her affidavit, that the army arrested him and took him to the army camp on the
night of June 5, 2000, after questioning him about the abduction of his landlord’s son.
(A.R. 170, 327.) Before the IJ, however, Kamurdeen testified that the army left that night
without arresting him and “went away” because it could not locate his friends. (A.R. 11011.) After the army left, Kamurdeen spoke with his father about moving to a new house,
and he and his father informed the landlord that the family would be moving. (A.R. 111,
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Our jurisdiction
generally extends only to the BIA’s order, but we may also review the IJ’s decision in
pertinent part where “the BIA both adopted the IJ’s adverse credibility determination and
discussed some, but not all, of the underlying bases” for that determination. Xie v.
Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). We need only review the BIA’s decision in
this case, however, because it independently discussed certain factors that it deemed
collectively sufficient to support the IJ’s ruling. We do so for substantial evidence, and
may disturb the BIA’s adverse credibility determination only if “‘any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543
F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Because Kamurdeen filed his application
prior to the effective date of the REAL ID Act, the inconsistencies on which the BIA
relied “must not be ‘minor’ and must go to the heart of [his] claim.” Id.
4

151-52.) Kamurdeen also testified that he did not go to work the following day but
instead stayed home. (A.R. 153.) He testified that the army returned to his house and
arrested him two months later on August 5, 2000. (A.R. 110-11.)
When the IJ asked Kamurdeen about this inconsistency, he first testified that the
army had arrested him on June 5 as set forth in his statement, then testified again that it
was August 5, and finally testified that he had been released rather than arrested on
August 5 (as opposed to August 15, as claimed in his statement and his mother’s
affidavit). (A.R. 156, 166.) When further pressed, Kamurdeen testified only that the
inconsistency was the result of “(Indiscernible.) Confusion.” (A.R. 166.)
This inconsistency strikes us as the most glaring and material inconsistency of
record. Kamurdeen, however, barely acknowledges this inconsistency on review, and
neither offers any explanation for this inconsistency nor argues that the BIA erred in
relying on it. He also “d[id] not address this glaring inconsistency on appeal” before the
BIA. (BIA Dec. at 1). Thus, he has both waived and failed to exhaust any challenge to
the BIA’s reliance on this inconsistency.2

2

Nevertheless, the BIA did not err in relying on this inconsistency. The record
confirms the inconsistency, and it clearly goes to the heart of Kamurdeen’s claim. Cf.
Gabuniya v. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 316, 322-23 (3d Cir. 2006) (six-day discrepancy
regarding date of arrest did not go to the heart of the claim where alien immediately
explained that he had mistakenly referred to date of an assassination that triggered the
arrest). Kamurdeen also offered no explanation for the inconsistency except to testify that
it was the result of “(Indiscernible.) Confusion.” (A.R. 166.) Kamurdeen did not
elaborate on that “confusion” before the BIA or in his brief in this Court and makes no
argument regarding what appears as “indiscernible” on the transcript.
5

Second, the BIA relied on additional discrepancies regarding the circumstances of
the June 5 incident. Kamurdeen asserted in his statement that he first heard screaming
from his landlord’s house “in the midnight” on June 5, that he then looked out the
window and witnessed Sisira’s abduction, and that his landlord and the army came to his
apartment thereafter. (A.327.) Similarly, his mother stated in her affidavit that the family
heard the screaming “while we were fast asleep.” (A.R. 170.) Before the IJ, however,
Kamurdeen testified that Sisira was kidnapped at around 7:30 p.m. and that he and his
father were awake and sitting outside when he witnessed the abduction. (A.R. 153-54.)
Kamurdeen argues with little elaboration that the IJ improperly found an
inconsistency on the basis of a mere absence of “definitive testimony” regarding the time
of the incident. Our review of the record, however, confirms that the BIA permissibly
found an inconsistency on these points. Kamurdeen does not argue that the record can be
read in a way that reconciles the apparent inconsistencies, and the record does not compel
such a reading. Kamurdeen also does not argue that these inconsistencies are
insufficiently related to his claim to support an adverse credibility determination, and we
do not believe they are.
Third, the BIA found Kamurdeen’s account of voluntarily returning to Sri Lanka
for two weeks without consequence incompatible with his claim that he was tortured
there and that the army had ordered him to report on a weekly basis. Under some
circumstances, voluntary return to a country where a petitioner claims to have been
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tortured can undermine his or her claims of past persecution and fear of future
persecution. See Jean v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2006); Toure v. Att’y Gen.,
443 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir. 2006).
In this case, Kamurdeen argues that the IJ and BIA disregarded his explanation for
returning – i.e., that he did so on the insistence of the agent who procured his United
States visa, then remained in hiding at the hotel near the airport. As Kamurdeen testified,
the agent promised him that he would be safe if he did not contact anyone in Sri Lanka,
including his family, and he followed that instruction by having no contact with anyone
but his agent, including his mother. (A.R. 129-30, 160.) His mother, however, stated in
her affidavit that she visited Kamurdeen at his hotel. (A.R. 171.) Kamurdeen offered no
explanation for that inconsistency except to deny that the visit occurred. (A.R. 160.) The
BIA rejected Kamurdeen’s explanation on the basis of his mother’s affidavit, and we
cannot say that the record compelled it to do otherwise.
The BIA held that these factors were sufficient to support the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination. It then went on to note that the record was “replete” with other
inconsistencies and discussed two additional bases for the IJ’s decision. Because the BIA
concluded that the deficiencies discussed above are sufficient to support the adverse
credibility determination, however, and because the record does not compel a contrary
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conclusion, we need not reach the additional inconsistencies.3 Accordingly, we will deny
the petition for review.4

3

We note, however, that we perceive no error in the BIA’s reliance on them. Both
Kamurdeen’s statement and his mother’s affidavit refer to their “landlord” and use the
pronouns “he,” “his” and “him” in doing so. (A.R. 169-70, 326-27.) Kamurdeen initially
did the same in his testimony. (A.R. 99-103, 107-08.) On further questioning, however,
he began to refer to a “landlady” and use feminine pronouns, and he testified that it had
been the family’s female landlord, not her husband, who was involved in the incidents
recounted above. (A.R. 132-34.) In addition, regarding the May 19 incident, Kamurdeen
asserted in his statement that the landlord’s “sons,” plural, attacked his friends and that
his friends responded by attacking his landlord’s sons. (A.R. 326.) His mother stated the
same in her affidavit, and also stated that she intervened to stop the fighting along with
Kamurdeen and his father. (A.R. 169). Before the IJ, however, Kamurdeen testified that
only his landlord’s oldest son Sisira was involved in the altercation (A.R. 144), and that
only he and his father intervened and that “my mother didn’t get involved” (A.R. 145).
4

In his brief, Kamurdeen challenges the IJ’s insistence on certain corroboration.
The BIA, however, relied solely on inconsistencies and implausibilities in Kamurdeen’s
testimony and neither faulted Kamurdeen for failing to corroborate his testimony nor
adopted that portion of the IJ’s ruling in which the IJ did so. See Chukwu, 484 F.3d at
191 (noting that credibility and corroboration are distinct issues). Thus, we do not reach
the issue of corroboration because it formed no basis for the BIA’s decision. Cf. id. at
188, 191 (reaching issue where BIA adopted the IJ’s decision).
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